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Abstract. 
Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms explores a timely topic at the intersection of 
economics, law, and policy reform. To date, most sophisticated theoretical work on corporate governance has 
focused on advanced market economies. In developed market economies, a system of corporate governance has 
been built gradually through centuries, and today it can be defined as a complex mosaic consisting of laws, 
regulations, politics, public institutions, professional associations and ethics codes. However, in transition 
economy countries a lot of details of the mosaic are still missing. 
 
1. Corporate governance problem in the economic literature. 
The corporate governance problem was first referred to by Berle and Means (1932) as the problem arising out of 
the separation of ownership and control in large corporations. Given their discretionary power, company 
managers may use company resources to their own advantage. Investors therefore cannot take their returns of 
cash flow from the company’s projects for granted.
1
 There is no such problem in companies with concentrated 
ownership as large shareholders have both the incentive to be actively involved in monitoring management and 
to bear the costs, as they reap most of the benefits. However, ownership concentration also reduces capital 
market liquidity and hence investors’ willingness to provide funds to companies in the market.  
Dispersed ownership and liquid capital markets can be found in both the United States and the United Kingdom. 
On the other hand, most European Countries have highly concentrated ownership and relatively illiquid capital 
markets
2
. La Porta et al. (1997,1998,1999) explain these differences by the differences in investors’ legal 
protection. The legal protection that investors receive determines their readiness to finance companies. The 
strong legal protection of creditors in German law for example explains the prevailing role of banks in company 
financing. Highly developed equity and debt markets in the United Kingdom are the result of the strong legal 
protection of British shareholders and creditors. Conversely, the underdeveloped equity and debt markets in 
France, Belgium and Italy arise from the low protection of both creditors and shareholders alike.  
Appropriate legal protection of investors prevents their rights from being expropriated by managers and is 
therefore one of the ways of solving the agency problem. In countries with poor legal protection, as is 
generally the case of continental European countries, investors seek out alternative ways to overcome 
management. The concentration of ownership and the resulting concentration of voting rights is, according 
to the proponents of the legal perspective of corporate governance, one example of large investors 
exercising their power (LaPorta et al., 1999). In companies with concentrated ownership the agency 
problem takes on a new dimension in the sense of the expropriation of the rights of minority shareholders 
by the large shareholders.  
The large shareholders can make managers act in their interests and at the expense of the company’s value, 
the minority shareholders and other stakeholders in the company. The fear of such expropriation by large 
shareholders reduces the willingness of the minority shareholders to invest funds in companies and thus 
has a negative impact on the capital market (LaPorta et al., 1996; Perotti, Modigliani, 1998). This could be 
                                                 
1 
This so-called agency problem represents the heart of the Jensen, Meckling and Coase contractual view of the 
firm. Hart, Grossman and Moore explain this problem by focusing squarely on the investors’ power relative to 
the insiders. By distinguishing between the contractual and residual control rights that investors have, the authors 
explain the incapability of the latter to write complete contracts that could determine all the actions and limit the 
discretion of the managers, also in unpredictable future circumstances. 
 
2
Thus, there are different systems of corporate governance. Most authors refer to the so-called outsider (USA, 
UK) and insider (Germany, Japan, Continental Europe) systems of corporate governance.  
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the main reason underlying the relatively small capital markets in continental European countries and thus 
the non-active markets for take-overs (Lannoo, 1998). However, the capital markets in the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland are an exception.  
Different legal frameworks are also the key factor behind differences in the concentration of voting rights in 
European countries
1
 (Becht, 1999). For example, German law permits the use of many legal devices such as 
preference shares, proxy voting, golden shares, voting trusts etc. that allow shareholders to concentrate their 
voting rights without concentrating ownership. Consequently, the concentration of ownership in German 
companies is lower than the concentration of voting power
2
. The same applies to the Netherlands where the 
concentration of voting rights mainly takes place through so-called administrative offices (De Jong, Kabir, Marra, 
Roell, 1998). The administrative office holds original shares and votes of the company-issuer and issues non-
voting certificates that can be listed on the Stock Exchange. The voting rights are thus concentrated in the hands 
of the insiders, while ownership remains dispersed. On the other hand, the concentration of voting rights in 
Belgium mainly takes place through pyramiding. The latter does not necessarily lead to more concentrated 
ownership, but allows income redistribution and creates the wrong incentives for monitoring.  
Debate continues on the most efficient corporate governance system in continental Europe. There probably 
should be no pyramid structures as they provide the owners with the wrong incentives and reduce the liquidity of 
capital markets. The latter in fact results from any increase in ownership concentration. The introduction of a 
mandatory take-over bid once a certain shareholder gains a determined threshold of a company’s shares could 
reduce the direct control by large shareholders. The introduction of the one-share-one-vote principle could 
reduce the percentage of non-voting shares in a company’s stock and cut the liquidity of the capital market. The 
trade-off between liquidity and control is thus yet to be found. 
Corporate governance involves regulatory and market mechanisms, and the roles and relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders, and the goals for which the 
corporation is governed. Lately, corporate governance has been comprehensively defined as "a system of law 
and sound approaches by which corporations are directed and controlled focusing on the internal and external 
corporate structures with the intention of monitoring the actions of management and directors and thereby 
mitigating agency risks which may stem from the misdeeds of corporate officers”. 
 
2.  Defining Corporate Governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that effective corporate governance is established either through a well 
develop legal framework and an active capital market, or through concentrated ownership. In an extension of this 
argument, La Porta, et al. (1997 and 1998) argued that in countries with better legal protection of shareholders, 
financial markets are more developed and firms have greater access to external finance and better opportunities 
for growth. 
In the literature of corporate governance, there is a disagreement about the boundaries of the subject of corporate 
governance. Depending on their perspective, different authors define corporate governance in different ways. In 
its narrowest sense, corporate governance can be viewed as a set of arrangements internal to the corporation that 
define the relationship between the owners and managers of the corporation. An example is the definition by 
Monks and  Minow  (2001): corporate governance “…is the relationship among various participants in 
determining the direction and performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the shareholders, (2) 
the management, and (3) the board of directors." The World Bank defines corporate governance from the two 
different perspectives. From the standpoint of a corporation, the emphasis is put on the relations between the 
owners, management board and other stakeholders (the employees, customers, suppliers, investors and 
                                                 
1
The United Kingdom is an exception as in most companies the ownership is dispersed. Half of the analysed 
companies in the UK, for example, do not have an owner holding more than 9.9 percent of the voting rights. One 
of the reasons for that dispersion could be the British Law on Take-overs which requires any shareholder 
acquiring 30 (or more) percent of shares to make a take-over bid (Becht, Roell, 1999). Roe (1994) claims that the 
main reason for the low dispersion of ownership rights in the USA lies in the financial institutions’ regulations 
that prevents financial institutions holding large ownership stakes in companies.  
2
 Becht (1999) found that the higher voting power concentration in Germany and Belgium resulted in lower 
liquidity of the companies’ stock. On the other hand, this is not the case of the 30 largest German companies 
forming the DAX that represent 60-70% of the market capitalisation and turnover in shares on German stock 
markets. The voting right concentration in these companies is not linked to ownership concentration but is 
obtained through different legal devices. It assures both the appropriate control over management and liquidity 
of the capital market. Further, the monitor-holders of substantial voting blocks have the right incentive to 
increase the value of the company they own.  
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communities). Major significance in corporate governance is given to the board of directors and its ability to 
attain long-term sustained value by balancing these interests. From a public policy perspective, corporate 
governance refers to providing for the survival, growth and development of the company and at the same time its 
accountability in the exercise of power and control over companies. The role of public policy is to discipline 
companies and, at the same time, to stimulate them to minimize differences between private and social interests. 
(World Bank, 1999). 
 
3.  Developing a corporate governance framework.  
The system of corporate governance can vary to a significant degree depending on the mechanisms which the 
owners of a corporation use to influence the managers (Davis, Useem, 2000). We may single out three different 
ways that owners maintain control over the work of management: 1) the owners directly influence the corporate 
strategy and selection of the top management team, 2) the owners delegate their rights to the board but ensure 
that compensation and other incentives are aligned with share price maximization and 3) the owners rely on the 
market mechanisms of corporate control, such as a takeover, when due to a decreasing share price new owners 
take over a company and change to management in order to rehabilitate the company and increase its market 
value.  
In other words, the corporate governance mechanisms can be both internal and external (Table 1). The internal 
mechanisms of corporate governance include: 1) ownership concentration, 2) board of directors, 3) ways of 
rewarding managers and 4) multidivisional organizational structure. The external mechanism of corporate 
governance refers to the market for corporate control, i.e., a group of potential owners attacking the undervalued 
companies in order to change the ineffective top management team and improve the competitive position of the 
company  (Babic & Janosevic, 2001a). 
 
 
 
4.  Developments in corporate governance in Serbia. 
Serbian corporate governance was up to 2000 an area largely unexplored both from the standpoint of its main 
mechanisms and from comparative law perspective with other European countries. Corporate governance has 
been, directly or indirectly, the subject of more intensive activity in Serbia over the past few years. Many factors 
resulted in limited interest in corporate governance reform. Most companies in Serbia are still owner-controlled 
and not listed on the Belgrade Stock Exchange. From 1869 registered companies, shares of 1062 companies are 
listed on the national stock exchange, while only 32 companies' shares are subjected to continual trade at the 
Belgrade Stock Exchange3. Limited interest in corporate governance reform is partly caused by the fact that 
many of large Serbian companies are still state-controlled. The privatization of the largest state-owned 
companies is to be finished during the following year. While institutional investors are to play a significant role 
in the process of corporate governance, their participation in Serbian companies, apart from the Pension and 
Share fund, are not significant. However, banks play an important role in corporate governance, participating a 
great deal in corporate financing and delegating their officers in companies' managing and supervisory boards. 
In Serbia, like in the most countries of Central and Southeast Europe, significant interventions and 
reconstructions have been made in corporate and securities legislation last years. Significant progress has been 
made in promoting private sector development, bringing down inflation, deregulation, improving public 
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administration. The condition of relative disorder and discriminatory regulation, which was encountered in the 
period of mass privatization in Serbia, has been changing rapidly during the last year. After two years of 
preparation, in June 2006, the Government of the Republic of Serbia has put into force several laws, which are to 
regulate in a more efficient way the sphere of corporate governance, financial and accounting management and 
the activity at the capital market. This package of laws that consists of Law on takeovers, Law on investment 
funds, Law on accounting and audit and new Law on securities and other financial instruments market, is 
harmonized with the European standards. The law system in Serbia now regulates corporate sector and capital 
markets in a consistent way with the comparative regulative of the developed European countries. However, 
there are opinions that the above laws were adopted too late, at the end of the privatization process, when 
"strong" domestic and foreign investors had already acquired all the positive effects of buying undervalued 
Serbian companies. The new Law on economic societies, largely based on EU practice, represents a significant 
advancement in comparison to the previous Law on enterprises. This law, that makes the regulatory basis for 
establishing the relation between shareholder and management structure, incorporates issues such as 1) scope, 
implementation and protection of shareholders rights, 2) structures, obligations and liabilities of the managing 
bodies, 3) judicial and other forms of protection. The Law on economic societies introduces improvements in the 
provisions relating to corporate governance, business combinations, corporate form conversion, disclosure 
requirement, and company liquidation outside bankruptcy. Another enhancement is the possibility of open and 
closed joint stock companies' existence. The provisions relating to limited liability companies have been 
simplified. 
Along with the improvements in regulative dealing with the operation of companies, the procedures for 
registration of new companies and filling of companies' documents have been much improved by putting into 
force the Law on Business Registry in January 2005. Law on securities and other financial instruments market 
links directly the activity at financial markets with corporate governance elements by including provisions 
relating to: 1) the obligation of public companies to keep the public informed about the company's activities, 2) 
the liability to provide true and accurate data in the prospectus and 3) the issue of insider information and their 
abuse. 
A particular progress in regulating corporate governance practice using external mechanisms is made by 
enacting the Law on takeovers. The importance of this law that regulates takeover bid procedure at Serbian 
market is particular having in mind that the law is fully harmonized with the Directive on takeover bids 
(2004/25/EC) adopted by EU parliament and the Council of the EU in April 2004. Key principles of the Law on 
takeovers are acquired from the Directive and refer to: (a) the equivalent treatment of all the shareholders of an  
offree company; (b) sufficient time and information that are to enable the holders of the securities of an  offeree 
company to make a proper decision on the bid; (c) the acting of the board of an offeree company in the interests 
of all the shareholders; (d) a prohibition of creation of false (artificial) markets of the securities of the offeree, 
offeror or of any other company concerned by the bid; (e) the announcing of a bid by an offeror after ensuring 
the fulfillment of any type of consideration; (f) non interrupting an offeree company to conduct its affairs during 
a bid duration. 
The new legislation of takeover activity should effect in a higher level of minority shareholders protection and 
equal status of all the owners in the acquisition process at the Serbian market for corporate control. The Law 
introduces provisions relating to sell-out and squeeze-out right, the establishment of an equitable price in 
mandatory bids as well as creation of adequate "playing field" that guarantees the proper information to all the 
participants in the bid. Putting into force the new legislation should has as a consequence a higher level of 
market for corporate control transparency as well as the prohibition of manipulation and impact on the target 
firms shareholders. 
Over the last years, a significant number of European countries have adopted (or are prepared to do so) voluntary 
corporate codes at the national or international level with the aim of better investor interest protection. Along 
with Serbian government growing concern about regulating corporate governance issues, a Code on corporate 
governance has been adopted in Serbia at the beginning of 2006. The Code on corporate governance (the Code) 
is issued by the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, the largest Serbian organization representing more than 120.000 
economic entities in a wide range of industries and services. 
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Table 2. Level of compliance with international standards of corporate governance. 
 
 
 
5. Corporate governance practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In order to analyze the application of corporate governance principles in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the  
World Bank, for the first time in the year 2006, made a Report on the Observance of Standards and the Codes 
(ROSC). An analysis of the following adherence to OECD principles was conducted: 
To adhere to certain principles, the assigned grades were “observed”, “largely observed”, “partially observed”, 
“materially not observed” and “not observed”. The results of the study are represented in the following table: 
Table 3. Frequency of Each Category –  Compliance with Corporate               Governance Principles 
 Principles % 
Observed 0 0 
Largely  observed 4 12,5 
Partially observed 22 68,8 
Materially not observed 6 18,7 
Not observed 0 0 
Total 32 100 % 
 Source :  Corporate Governance in  FBIH  – the results of research in 2011, SEE Business Solution d.o.o. 
Sarajevo. 
  
For adhering to the majority of principles, Bosnia and Herzegovina received the grade “partially observed”. For 
adhering to the principles of the basic stockholders right, the shareholders GMS rights, the principle stakeholder 
redress, and the creditor rights law and enforcement, B&H received a poorer grade, namely “largely observed”. 
The grade “materially not observed”, B&H received for not adhering to the following principles: the rights of 
shareholders to participate in fundamental decisions, Board/Managers disclosure of interests, stakeholder 
disclosure, whistleblower protection, disclosure standards and acting with due diligence, care. In no case did 
Bosnia and Herzegovina receive the grades “observed” or “not observed”. 
 
6. Application of  Corporate Governance Principles by companies in Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
In 2011 the independent consulting firm SEE Business Solutions d.o.o Sarajevo has conducted an analysis of the 
application of corporate governance principles by companies in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
study processed 55 joint stock companies. The results according to the analyzed areas were the following: 
Firstly, The management and supervisory board.  More than 50 % of the analyzed companies the supervisory 
board consists of only 3 members and only 11% of board company members are independent, while 38 % 
members are either stockholders or employees in the company. Important to say that in 38 companies the 
compensations for supervisory board members are fixed and 12 companies don’t pay compensation to the board 
members. Only 8 companies have formed Commissions of the Supervisory/Management board. 
Secondly, Control environment.  From the 55 analyzed companies, 43 have established a system of internal 
control, while the position of internal auditor exists in 28 companies. 31 companies have established a risk 
management system. 
Thirdly,  The publications.  Only 23 company financial reports are available on the web site, which is less than 
50% of analyzed companies. Independent auditor’s reports can be found at only 21 web sites. Regarding the 
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publishing of transaction with concerned parties and information on materially significant events, 28 companies 
publish the information. 
Fourthly, Stockholders' rights and protection. The payment of dividends in the past 3 years did have only from 
10 companies, while 45 companies did not pay their dividends.  From 55 companies that have analyzed, 41 
companies stated that they formally incorporate social responsibility through internal documents. 
Based on recommendations given in the OECD report from year 2006 and accordance to the newest researches, 
we can single out some key courses for corporate governance development in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
- The companies should strengthen the supervisory board, increase the number of members, insist upon the 
independence of members, form commissions for the naming of supervisory board members, as well as define 
compensation policy for the members of the supervisory board. 
- It is necessary for more companies to organize their own control environment in accordance with their own 
level of risk exposure and to manage risk more intensively 
- According to OECD principles, companies should publish all significant information such as financial and 
business company results, the goals of the company, the ownership structure, data on board members and their 
compensations, as well as their corporate governance policies 
- Greater the protection of interests of minor shareholders. Shareholders very often do not have at their disposal 
important information on the business of the company and this impedes upon their security 
- The access to relevant information has to be simple and timely, and the publishing of data on transactions of 
connected parties should be strengthened. This research has shown that joint stockholder companies in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the situation being similar in companies in the smaller Bosnian and 
Herzegovina entity, the Republic of  Serbia, have not attained significant improvement in the past few years. The 
reason for the stated problem can be in the misunderstanding of corporate governance principles and the 
importance of incorporating good corporate governance practices. 
 
7. Corporate Governance in Albania, regulated by the law and principles.   
The corporate governance framework in Albania is essentially regulated by Law no. 9901 approved by the 
Albanian Parliament on 14 April 2008 on “Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies”, which entered into force 
on 21 May 2008 and replaced the previous legislation on business organisations in Albania (Laws no. 7632/1992 
and no. 7638/1992). The new law regulates individual entrepreneurs and commercial companies. In contrast to 
the previous company law, the 2008 law also includes the definition of branches and representative offices of 
foreign companies and details provisions on groups of companies. Companies incorporated under the old regime 
have a three-year transition period in which to align their organisational structure with the new law. Joint stock 
companies can be organised under a one- or two-tier system. Under the two-tier system, the General 
Shareholders Meeting appoints the Supervisory Board. The Managing Board can then be appointed by either the 
General Shareholders Meeting or the Supervisory Board, as regulated by the company by-laws. The legislative 
competition in European countries is contributing to attract foreign investments, because there exist a positive 
correlation between strong law based protection of minority shareholders and foreign investments. Albanian 
legislation is in the same pace offering this legislative framework; it aims at guaranteeing minority shareholders 
some basic rights in order to achieve their economic interests and to make safe investments.The new 2008 law 
has addressed some of the shortcomings highlighted in the assessment and the framework has now improved. 
Actually by the Albanian Ministry of Economy Trade and Privatization is approved The Corporate Governance 
Principles for All Unlisted Companies. Very important this code for Albanian companies that are not listed in the 
TSE in accordance with corporate governance in everyday activities. 
 
8. Capital market in Albania as a important part of corporate governance. 
Important is that the corporate governance is more effective if the company is quoted in stock exchange, because 
the value of company is more real.TSE is inactive and the corporate governance is not effective.In the 
questionary of 30 companies ( large companies, anonymous society in Tirana,Albania) 25 of them tell us that 
there is no corporate governance in Albania if there TSE is inexistent,5 of them there is no need for corporate 
governance.But 30 companies tell us that is the time for Stock Exchange.  The only organized securities market 
in Albania is the Tirana Stock Exchange (TSE) founded in 1996. In 2002, the TSE was restructured as a joint 
stock company with the Ministry of Finance as its exclusive owner, and in 2007 it was licensed by the FSA to 
conduct stock exchange transactions in Albania. As of today there are no companies listed on the TSE; 
consequently there are no recorded transactions. Insurance market must abide to certain limitations with respect 
to investments in real estate and securities. Private pension funds occupy an insignificant position in the 
institutional investor arena. These entities also invest in treasury bills and bank deposits.Currently there are no 
investment funds. Yet, a new Law No 10198, dated 10.12.2009 “On Collective Investment Undertakings”, aims 
at developing such institutions The corporate bond market remains undeveloped. The passage of a new law “On 
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Corporate and Local Government Bonds” aims at fostering the development of the market. Government bonds 
with a maturity of over 1 year are sold in the primary market through auctions organized by the Bank of Albania. 
The Government has issued bonds of respectively 2, 3, 5 and 7 year maturities, with variable and fixed interest 
rates. After their issuance, such bonds are traded on the retail market by licensed entities. 
 
9. Corporate Governance in Romania.   
The enterprises from Central and Eastern European countries (including Romania) have a common governance 
model based on internal control, as a result of the privatization and reorganization process. In this context, the 
insider - based model could be redefined as a form of organization of firms resulted from buying up control 
rights by the managers or the employees of ex-enterprises owned by the state during the privatization process, 
from owning substantial stocks portfolios by insiders in case of the privatization process, or from exerting their 
interests in the decisions process at the level of the strategic enterprises, when they are still in the state property. 
The inside control is considered an essential issue because the managers who own an excessive control on the 
enterprises may act in the detriment of shareholders, employees and other stakeholders, affecting thus the 
financial results and firm performance. In these circumstances it should be underlined the necessity of getting 
efficient this system by developing capital markets and banking systems as ways to influence internally or 
externally the systems of corporate governance for firms in the developing and emerging economies. Inevitably, 
establishing some adequate mechanisms of corporate governance of privatized enterprises in these countries was 
difficult in the conditions of the lack of a legal infrastructure, as well as lack of regulations about property rights, 
demands of accounting-financial reports, firms bankruptcy etc. The structures of firm’s governance in European 
countries in transition were strongly influenced by the objectives of the privatization process, such as political 
responsibility, legal regulations and the efficiency of the privatization. Taking into consideration the priority of 
these objectives and political and economic conditions, the privatization process has registered relatively 
different forms in Central and Eastern European countries. As a result, the corporate governance systems from 
Central and Eastern European countries are inefficient, as a result of focusing power by the employees, 
management and as a result of the lack of outside or inside control exerted by the other stakeholders, such as 
banks, institutional investors, or through active capital markets. Although there are signs that the financial results 
of privatized firms are in average superior to exstate enterprises, the reorganization is still done in a slow rate, 
and the process of investing is very low, which will affect long term performances of respective firms. Although 
the extent of remaining government ownership differs from one country to another, private ownership dominates 
everywhere. Ownership and control are becoming increasingly concentrated, with the emergence of corporate 
groupings and significant foreign owners in most countries. As firms grow in size, ownership and control are 
separated, primarily by the use of a pyramid structure. Most firms in Central and Eastern Europe are still owner-
managed, but professional management is becoming more common (Berklof, Pajuste, 2003). In Romania, the 
companies are characterized by the same general model of corporate governance, the insider - based control of 
employees and management, but with certain particularities regarding national, economical, social, politic, 
cultural conditions, where governance forms appeared and developed. The corporate governance of Romanian 
enterprises and at the same time the trend of their performances can not be analyzed and understood just through 
the evolution of the reform process, in the context of transition from planned economy to market economy, what 
determined deep changes in the macroeconomic universe. The main methods of privatization which generated 
the formation of the private sector in Romania were: MEBO method, mass privatization program or privatization 
through sales to investors outside the enterprises. The principles of corporate governance imply a series of 
measures that lead, finally, to the growing of transparency of listed companies, what makes them more attractive. 
That is why implementing the corporate governance code of OECD has preoccupied the representatives of Stock 
Exchange from Bucharest for many years. A first step was made in August 2001, when the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange elaborated a Code of Corporate Governance and introduced a virtual tier, the Plus tier,for the listed 
companies which wanted to implement the principles of corporate governance. In 2003, it was founded the 
Institute of Corporate Governance of BVB (Bucharest Stock Exchange) in order to increase the professional 
standards for managers. The principles of the corporate governance were included in the capital market 
legislation. But the new capital market law has yet its disadvantages: it is too general, leaving place for 
interpretations, being implemented just partially the principles of corporate governance. Even in the last years 
there were registered positive effects regarding the opening of the managers towards the communication with the 
investors, the expected results regarding the implementation of corporate governance principle did not appeared. 
Therefore, Bucharest Stock Exchange intends to elaborate in 2008 a new Code of Corporate Governance, more 
complex and more adapted to the European legislation. Besides the principles of corporate governance or more 
strict rules regarding the informing of investors, the new code will introduce a new issue for the Romanian 
market: the concept of independent leadership. Another novelty is the fact that the listed companies can 
implement voluntary the code, but they should mention it in the yearly report and they have to motivate the 
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rejection/inobservance of some of the stipulations (the principle "comply or explain"). By contrary, the 
inefficient governance of listed companies influences negatively the economic financial results and their 
possibilities of future developing taking in consideration the followings:  
• the decrease of the rhythm for the restructuring and reorganization;  
• following mainly short term purposes of employees and managers, such as rising salaries and other 
bonuses, stability and protection of work places;  
• lack of investments for modernization or developing the productive potential of enterprises;  
• excessive mobility of staff as a result of intern conflicts;  
Among the most important ways of encroaching upon the rights of shareholders in Romania are the followings: 
dilution of the shareholders’ earnings; transferring profits outside the company; abusive allocation of the profits; 
delay in offering the dividends; limited access for shareholders to information. The main problem of corporate 
firms in Romania is the conflict of interests between stakeholders and shareholders which generates 
misunderstandings between management and shareholders, as well as between shareholders and business 
partners of the company, typical especially in developing economies, leading to the decrease of long term 
performances of the companies and even their bankruptcy.  
 
10. Corporate Governance in Macedonia. 
The numbers taken from the IFC's Corporate Governance Manual for Macedonian companies  and the survey of 
USAID/Business Environment Activity (BEA) are valid until 2008 and were retrieved from the Central 
Depositary. The number of Joint Stock Companies at that time was  577 , with total number of shareholders 174 
870. Thus , largest type of holders is the domestic  individuals  (95.64%) , followed by domestic legal entities 
(2.43%). The foreign individuals form  a group of 1.43% and the smallest is the group of foreign legal entities 
with 0.45% of shares in  the Macedonian joint stock companies (IFC , 2008). On the other hand  , if we observe 
the number of shares that are owned by various types of owners  we get completely different picture , which 
confirms the first hypothesis in this study.  Hence , more than half (56.68%) of the shares in the Macedonian 
joint stock companies are owned by the  foreign legal entities. This group is followed by domestic legal entities 
which own 34.23% of all shares in the country, and at the end there are domestic and foreign individual owners 
who hold  in total less than 10% of the shares in the Macedonian joint stock companies (IFC, 2008).  The fact 
that more than half of the shares in the Macedonian joint stock companies are owned by foreign legal entities is 
connected to the movements in foreign direct investment and thus to the second hypothesis. Furthermore , it is 
evidence of dispersion of shareholding by domestic owners against concentration of control of foreign entities.  
10.1 The Governance Structure of Macedonian Joint Stock Companies.   
Two out of five joint stock companies (170) have a one-tier board of directors (board of directors), where all 
board members meet together to govern the company. Board meetings usually last two and half hours. The 
executive directors almost always attend board meetings. Most of the non-executive members usually attend, 
though they may miss a few meetings. Board members frequently ask questions during the meetings and almost 
always vote. A transportation company operating with 270 full-time employees. There are four members on the 
supervisory board. They meet four times a year, usually for two hours each time. Nearly all of the board 
members attend the supervisory board meetings. Overall, 92% of all joint stock companies with one-tier boards 
of directors have 1 to 3 executive directors. Most have 1 to 3 non-executive directors (49%) or 4 to 7 non-
executives (43%). For many companies with a one-tier board, the board has 4 to 7 members (81%). Many 
supervisory boards in joint stock companies with a two-tier board have three members (37%) or five (22%). In 
total, 76% of joint stock companies with two- tier boards have at least five members on the supervisory board. 
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